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EARLY OFFERS AS CONTINGENT FEE REFORM
Jeffrey O'Connell*
Do contingent fees in personal injury cases pose enough of a prob-
lem to warrant significant reform, either by legislation or court rule?
In thinking about the need for reform in any area, one must admit-
tedly keep in mind the dangers of unanticipated second and third or-
der effects from change. Thus, a problem must be significant indeed
in order to justify significant reform.
So, is there a significant problem? If so, what kind of significant
reform will improve things? After extensive empirical research (by
his own admission on a shaky database) Professor Herbert Kritzer
seems of two minds as to whether there is a problem. 1 The thrust of
his remarks seems at best doubtful about the extent of the problem,
but then he abruptly turns around and proposes some very drastic re-
forms which will cause gross upheavals in the way payment is to be
made for legal services to personal injury claimants. For example,
Professor Kritzer proposes that nonlawyers be allowed to compete
with lawyers in settling personal injury cases. 2 Already, however,
there are many and widespread complaints of the activities of lawyers
(and their agents) insensitively harassing accident victims in order to
represent victims' claims. Already the airwaves are filled with annoy-
ing ads by lawyers to actual and potential accident victims trumpeting
lawyers' claims services. Professor Kritzer apparently wants much
more of all of this-indeed under his proposal we will probably not
only get much more of it, but it will also be implemented more insen-
sitively by individuals totally unconstrained by any professional ca-
nons of ethics. 3 Witness, for example, complaints by high school and
college athletes of the intrusive tactics by would-be agents to repre-
* Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. An
earlier version of this Comment was presented at the.Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort
Law and Social Policy, addressing Contingent Fee Financing of Litigation in America, Chicago,
Illinois, April 4-5, 1997.
1. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REV. 267 (1998); see George C. Leef, Lawyer Fees Too High? The Case for Repeal-
ing Unauthorized Practice of Law Statutes, 21 REG. 33 (1997).
2. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 308-09 & n.120.
3. Cf Nina Bernstein, Battles over Lawyer Advertising Divide the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, July 19,
1997, at Al (describing the "patchwork" of state rules regulating lawyers' advertisements).
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sent them in contracts for professional football or basketball. Witness
too, the countless interruptions of so many of us by phone calls from
stockbrokers and other financial consultants importuning us to take
over our investments. 4 Witness also the activities of claims adjusting
services which purport to represent insureds in their fire insurance
clairs-activities that stain such personnel as the lowest level in the
whole insurance chain (none too imposing at the top).5 Query: Even
assuming the abandonment of limitations on the unauthorized prac-
tice of law as to personal injury cases is politically feasible (very
doubtful for the above and other reasons), is this a solution to the
current problems engendered by the personal injury contingent fee?
But at least Professor Kritzer is sufficiently concerned about the in-
adequacies of the present operation of the contingent fee to indicate
that consumers are not being given sufficient information so as to ex-
act fair fees from counsel. 6 And Professor Kritzer is not alone at this
Symposium in pointing to the lack of information to the legally unso-
phisticated injury victim vis-A-vis the professionally trained lawyer as a
key problem. But as Malcolm Wheeler tells us in his perceptive re-
marks, even very sophisticated business clients dealing with business
problems (the parameters of which are often more certain than per-
sonal injury claims) find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
bargain with precision for contingent or other legal fees.7 The vari-
ables, Mr. Wheeler indicates, are just too vast. So simply increasing
the information to personal injury claimants is surely no solution,
Wheeler says, even assuming the personal injury lawyer can be given
an incentive to provide it.8 Ex ante even personal injury lawyers
themselves may lack sufficient information to fairly appraise, at the
moment of hire, the value of their services. Thus, the ex ante solution
of more information seems chimerical.
So, in turn, even by Professor Kritzer's somewhat begrudging ac-
knowledgment, there seems to be a problem of overreaching by con-
4. "Complaints about unsolicited 'cold calls' from stockbrokers selling investments rose 23%
during the first six months of [1997] ... from a year earlier, the SEC said. An SEC study [also]
found that these phone calls make up the fastest-growing category of investor complaints." Di-
gest, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 1997, at C1.
5. Peter Hellman, Your Policy Is Hereby Canceled, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1970, § 6 (Magazine),
at 32, 126. All this is not to say that there may not be other means of lessening lawyer oligopoly.
I hope to make some proposals concerning this shortly.
6. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 289-90.
7. Malcolm Wheeler, Comments at the Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and So-
cial Policy (April 4,1997). Wheeler is a lawyer with the firm of Pacel, Mauro, Hultin, and Spaan-




tingent fee lawyers 9-and that is certainly the position of
knowledgeable and unbiased critics such as Derek Bok, former Presi-
dent and Law School Dean of Harvard.10
Two candid admissions made at this Symposium by eminent per-
sonal injury lawyer Robert Clifford would seem to buttress that
view." If the incentives currently engendered by the contingent fee
cause lawyers even in dealing with themselves to openly and grossly
violate their own canons of ethics, there would indeed seem to be a
problem. Clifford admits that contingent fee personal injury lawyers
are unilaterally and improperly robbing Peter to pay Paul: overcharg-
ing some clients in order to undercharge others. 12 Now some cross
subsidization is inevitable in pricing many types of services. But when
charges of a third or more of recovery are admittedly being improp-
erly charged by professional fiduciaries, that has to be a cause of great
concern for the profession thus misbehaving and for society in gen-
eral. Furthermore, query whether contingent fee lawyers generally do
pass the excessive fees charged to some claimants on to still other
claimants as opposed to retaining the improper gains for themselves.
Such eleemosynary behavior is "inconsistent with the routine process
by which attorneys screen prospective clients to determine whether
the risk-reward ratios of accepting each new case . . . [are]
favorable."'13 Moreover, even assuming such cross subsidies take
place, attorneys could not justify them any more than they could
falsely double the claimed time spent on behalf of hourly rated fee
clients on the grounds that this practice generates increased pro bono
service by the overcharging attorney. Robbing Peter to (maybe) pay
Paul is simply inconsistent with the attorney's fiduciary duty to deal
fairly with each of his or her clients.' 4
Secondly, Clifford alludes to the practice of personal injury trial
lawyers unfairly rebating one-third of their own one-third fees to law-
yers who refer cases to them.15 Under the canons of ethics, such refer-
ral fees can only be justified by the bona fide efforts of the referring
9. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 285-90.
10. DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 140 (1993). For further criticism of Professor Kritzer's
work, see Hearings on Liability Reform Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade and Con-
sumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Lester
Brickman).
11. Robert Clifford, Comments at the Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social
Policy (April 4, 1997). Clifford is the founding attorney of the Clifford Law Offices in Chicago,
Illinois.
12. Id.
13. LESTER BRICKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 23 (1994) (citation omitted).
14. Id.
15. Clifford, supra note 11.
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lawyer in aiding in the actual prosecution of the case.16 But, as Clif-
ford candidly admits, such efforts by the referring attorney are almost
uniformly fictitious. The only service the referring lawyer performs is
the routine forwarding itself. If lawyers are thus routinely behaving
unethically by their own lights as between each other, one is entitled,
is one not, to question how ethically they are behaving toward non-
lawyers in matters (such as the size of the fee) where there is an obvi-
ous conflict of interest? A corollary of such rebates, after all, is that
there is so much padding in the fee charged by the actual trial attorney
that there is plenty left over to pay the referring attorney relatively
lavi;hly for services not rendered.
Such referrals do not seem to bother Professor Bruce Hay in his
intriguing remarks at this Symposium. 17 (Hay did not address the
problem that they are in naked violation of the canons of ethics.) 18 At
least, he argues, such referrals provide an incentive on the part of the
relatively inexpert referring lawyer to forward the case to a more ex-
pert one.19 But here, Professor Hay seems at odds with his Harvard
16. The ethical quicksand presented by so-called referring fees was "revealed in an embarrass-
ing case in Miami." JEFFREY O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN
143 (1979).
Attorney Edward Strickland received a "forwarding fee" of $25,333 from a leading
personal injury lawyer, Perry Nichols. Nichols had won a $190,000 verdict for a widow
whose husband had been killed in an automobile accident. Nichols took the standard
40 percent, or $76,000, with Strickland getting the customary one-third of Nichols's fee
for forwarding the case. The sticking point was that Strickland was a judge and thus
was violating the law if he was practicing law on the side. Caught in this bind, Strick-
land resorted to honesty about how little a forwarding lawyer does. He protested that
'the mere referral of the case on the telephone did not take one minute. I played no
part in the case, gave no advice, prepared no pleadings." Thus his defense was in effect
that referring a case does not rise to the dignity of practicing law! [True enough,]...
but it took a strange twist of affairs to get ... [such an admission].
Id. al 143-44 (quoting MURRAY TEIGH BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS 144 (1968)).
17. Bruce Hay, Comments at the Third Annual Clifford Seminar on Tort Law and Social
Policy (April 5, 1997). Hay is a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
18. Id.
19. Id. The problems of not referring a case are illustrated by lawyers who will hold onto a
case without being experienced in personal injury practice and will thereafter negotiate or liti-
gate the matter without being qualified to do so.
One of the most respected federal trial judges in the country-formerly a leading trial
lawyer as well as scholar-commenting ... on Chief Justice Burger's estimate that one-
third to one-half of American lawyers are not properly qualified for trial advocacy, said
that:
[T]he biggest cause of inept trial lawyering is the non-personal injury lawyer
who reads in the Jury Verdict Reporter newsletter that some big name lawyer
like Philip Corboy has won a $450,000 verdict for a broken leg. The kid next
door then breaks his leg on a skateboard and such a lawyer thinks it's worth
$450,000 out of which he's going to net, say, $150,000. (That's a lot of real
estate closings!) But his case is not a $450,00 case-it's a $1,500 case at the
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colleague, Professor Robert Mnookin.20 Mnookin acknowledges, but
is not all that impressed by the problem of the contingent fee. Rather,
he focuses on the overall problems of the costs of personal injury liti-
gation, of which the contingent fee is obviously only a part.
21
Mnookin focuses on more general problems of the present system.
22
But solving the overall problems of personal injury tort law's ineffi-
ciencies is something society has balked at doing for generations.23 To
attack a significant piece of the problem-excessive contingent fees
along with some corollary baneful disincentives on the defendants'
side 24-seems worthier to some of us than to Professor Mnookin. In
other words, Mnookin is right: the problem is bigger than the contin-
gent fee but that does not necessarily mean it does not make sense to
address its abuses.
Turning from ex ante solutions, like more information or more com-
petition from nonlawyers, to ex post solutions, the remarks here of
Judge Charles Kocoras confirm that we cannot expect the judiciary to
most. But with stars in his eyes he refuses a reasonable settlement. In fact
professionally and temperamentally he's totally inadequate for trial work. He
hates the combat and is completely out of his element. But, not being willing
to settle, he comes to court along with his client, and they both take an awful
beating. That's where inadequate trial work stems from.
At the other end of the spectrum is the lawyer who knows he is inadequate to appear in
court and who is known by insurance companies to be inadequate. And yet out of
greed he keeps his own personal injury cases and settles them for a pittance, rather
than share a fee with an expert trial lawyer whose efforts could insure a proper settle-
ment. Furthermore, some lawyers will "wholesale" their cases with insurance compa-
nies. That means that they will settle all claims of their clients against a given company
in a package deal, often for a fraction of their combined value, unconscionably mixing
the solid claims with the shaky. After taking his own very substantial cut, such a lawyer
then assumes arbitrary power to distribute what is left to individual clients. In view of
the wide differences possible even in experts' appraisal of tort cases, the clients have
little basis for ... [knowing they've been maltreated].
O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 144-45 (citations omitted).
20. Robert H. Mnookin, Negotiation, Settlement and the Contingent Fee, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
363 (1998).
21. Id. at 369-70.
22. Id. at 363-69.
23. The huge problems plaguing auto insurance claims including fortuity of payment, long
delays, huge transaction costs, and over- and underpayment of claims, were documented two-
thirds of a century ago in 1932 by the prominent "Columbia Report." COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY
COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932). For a description of the subsequent ex-
tensive literature similarly outlining the problem and proposing similarly sweeping solutions as
of 1965, see ROBERT KEETON & JEFFREY O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM ch. 4 (1965). For a more recent capsule summary of the various auto no-fault plans, see
IRVIN E. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE ch. 14 (3d ed. 1995) and FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 13.8 (2d ed. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1 1997).
24. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
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address an excessive contingent fee after the settlement of a case.25
Judges are already overwhelmed by the small percentage of personal
injury cases filed that they actually try: less than five percent. Can we
expect them to reopen the over ninety-five percent of cases settled in
order to, in effect, review their merits so as to appraise, in turn, the
risks assumed by the plaintiff's attorney in order to appraise, still fur-
ther in turn, the appropriateness of the contingent fee? To expect
such efforts seems totally unrealistic.
So, if both such ex ante and ex post solutions for contingent fees do
not seem all that promising or likely, what if anything can be done?
Lester Brickman, Michael Horowitz, and I have suggested the follow-
ing: defendants in personal injury cases would be authorized, under
either legislation or court rule, to make an early settlement offer, say
within sixty days. If no offer is made, the claimant's lawyer is free to
negotiate a fee just as he or she does today. But if such an offer is
made and accepted, the compensation to a claimant's lawyer would be
limited to a reasonable hourly rate or ten percent of the gross settle-
ment, whichever is less. Furthermore, if an early offer was made and
refused, the offer would become the basis on which a contingency fee
would be computed. For example, if the defense offered $90,000 and
the plaintiff declined and the case was later settled for $100,000, then
the maximum the claimant's lawyer could charge would be ten per-
cent. of the $90,000 plus a third or more of $10,000, representing the
difference between the $90,000 offer and the $100,000 that was later
won. Note that by the same token this early offer system reduces de-
fendants' incentive to harass claimants by stalling or other obstructive
behavior.26 An early offer of, for example, $10,000 yields $9,000 for
the claimant after attorney's fees, whereas in the absence of an early
offer delivering the same $9,000 to the plaintiff later on, when the law-
yer typically can claim, say, forty percent of the payout, would cost the
defense $15,000.27
If it is feared, as some have alleged, that defendants would "game"
the system by, for example, making unduly low offers which would
25. The Honorable Charles Kocoras, Contingent Fees-A Judge's Perch, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
421 (1998).
26. A defendant today can harass claimant's counsel by delaying things through motions and
discovery that significantly cut into counsel's take from his contingent fee. After all, every hour
not spent in enhancing recovery is money lost for claimant's counsel.
27. For a complete draft of the contingency fee proposal adaptable either as legislation or
courl rule, see Lester Brickman et al., The Proposal, with Section-by-Section Commentary, ap-
pearing in Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A Proposal for Contin-
gency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173, app. at 194-211 (1995). For the terms of a federal bill, see
S. 1861, 104th Cong. (1996).
[Vol. 47:413
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unduly disadvantage a claimant's lawyer, the system could be limited
to being effective only when the early offer is accepted. 28 In other
words, only when an early offer is made and accepted, would the offer
become the basis on which the lower fee would be computed. In turn,
the defendant's incentive to make early offers large enough to be
likely accepted would be enhanced.
Professor Kritzer objects to this early offer solution as "mechanis-
tic."'29 But rules are, by their nature, likely to be mechanistic. A net
in tennis is mechanistic, as is a statute of limitations. The question is:
Does the rule work? Given the dimensions of the present problem
and the huge difficulties of other solutions outlined above, the early
offer solution would seem to deserve a try.
28. As to the objection that "defendants [may] exploit the inherent conflict-of-interest ex-
ist[ing] in all contingen[t] fee cases between plaintiffs and their counsel by making . . . sub-
optimal early offers [which are] designed to make what is left of the case less than worthwhile for
claimants' counsel to pursue," note that this conflict is inherent in all settlement offers. BRICK-
MAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 37. All offers to settle "by defendants under today's system are
designed to make [any] additional ... [amount] ... too small" to justify the risks necessary to
obtain anything higher. Id. The Brickman-Horowitz-O'Connell proposal, by way of contrast,
encourages offers to be made at a very early stage in the process of "achiev[ing] both earlier
payments... [for claimants along with] ... substantial transaction cost savings ... and ... do[es]
so without imposing greater burdens or risks on plaintiffs than... [are] currently face[d]. Id. As
the authors have put it:
[A]ny time a settlement offer is made-whether at the courthouse steps or during or
even after trial (in the latter case pending an appeal)-the defendant purports to offer
just enough so that what remains unmet of the claimant's demand will not be deemed
worth fighting further about. By placing the most attractive moment to achieve a set-
tlement at an early point in the proceedings[,] however, the [Brickman-Horowitz-
O'Connell] proposal has the powerful virtue of allowing the parties (and the judicial
administration system) a means of escape from the delays, costs and other burdens of
litigation that beset the present system.
Id. at 37-38.
29. Kritzer, supra note 1, at 307.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:413
